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Abstract 
According to polls from the 2006 congressional elections, globalization 
and economic insecurity were the primary concerns of many voters. These 
Americans apparently believe that they have fallen victim to liberal trade 
polices and that inexorable trends in globalization are destroying the 
American Dream.  In this analysis, we use time series cross-section data 
from the General Social Survey (GSS) to examine the links among 
offshoring, labor market volatility, and the demand for social insurance.  
Unique among the GSS literature, our analysis includes a pseudo-panel 
model which permits including auxiliary state and regional 
macroeconomic information.  
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Views expressed are the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, the Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve System.  1  Introduction 
Polls from the 2006 congressional elections placed globalization and economic insecurity 
as the driving forces behind the large economic populist vote, and found that 40 percent 
of Americans think the next generation will have a lower standard of living than today. 
Moreover, 62 percent said there was less job security and 59 percent said they had to 
work harder to earn a decent living.  Many Americans undoubtedly believe they have 
fallen victim to liberal trade polices and that globalization is destroying the American 
Dream: 75 percent said outsourcing work overseas hurts American workers.
1 
Conversely, most economists would argue the U.S. economy has been enriched 
by increases in world trade.  According to Bradford, Grieco and Hufbauer (2006), 
globalization has brought an extra $800 billion to $1.4 trillion annual income (or about 
$7,000 to $13,000 per household) to the United States since World War II.  At the same 
time, many economists have expressed concern regarding the uneven occupational, 
regional, and industry-specific impact of increased trade: While the economy gains 
overall, not everyone gains.  Globalization is exposing a deep fault line between groups 
who have the skills and mobility to flourish in global markets and those who either don’t 
have these advantages or perceive the expansion of unregulated markets as inimical to 
social stability and deeply held norms (Rodrik, 1997).   
Globalization displaces workers and creates insecurities that increase the demand 
for social insurance (Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1997).  As a result, postwar globalization was 
founded on the principle that the federal government would provide economic security, 
while free international markets would provide the best aggregate outcomes.  The search 
naturally arises for a mechanism to “share” the gains from trade.  Absent a suitable 
political consensus, the objections or even the visibility of the harmed persons, regions, 
and industries, threaten to derail and perhaps reverse reductions in trade barriers as they 
have done in the past.   
Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffery Williamson (1999) note that 19
th century 
globalization sowed the seeds of its own destruction.  Political backlash due to economic 
                                                 
1For poll results and mass media reports on economic insecurity see Greenhouse (2006), Orszag 
(2006),Lynch (2006), or Summers (2006).    
-1-insecurity, not economic factors, killed globalization.
2  Somewhat regrettably, postwar 
changes in the economy are likely to have increased workers’ anxiety today, most notably 
the significant change in the composition of traded goods and services.   
Traditionally, trade is thought of as exchanging different goods across nations, not 
the shifting of production from one country to another, followed by return shipments 
back to the original country.  For example, in the past, U.S. firms would export good x 
and import good y.  In the New Economy, U.S. firms export the capital k needed to 
produce good x to a country with lower production costs and then re import good x.
3  
Theoretically, disaggregating the value chain has allowed U.S. business to substitute 
cheaper foreign labor for domestic labor, increasing firms’ own price elasticity of 
demand for labor, raising the volatility of wages and employment, which increase worker 
insecurity.   
This phenomenon of rising economic insecurity in developed nations during the 
1990s (and now, as we will show, into the 2000s) has sparked widespread interest in its 
causes and consequences.  Past research suggests the implications of rising insecurity are 
far-reaching: including wage restraint, ill health, reduction in consumer expenditure, and 
economic inequality.
4  There is a vast collection of literature examining the structural 
determinates impacting perceptions of economic insecurity in the United States (e.g., 
Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998; Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Manski and Straub, 2000; 
Schmidt, 1999).  Unfortunately, empirical research explicitly connecting globalization to 
increased economic insecurity is non-existent.  This paper is the first, to our knowledge, 
to empirically examine the forces of globalization—more specifically, offshoring— and 
workers’ perceived economic insecurity in the United States.  
In this article, we use 1977-2004
5 data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to 
investigate if U.S workers have, in fact, become more pessimistic about their economic 
                                                 
2 O’Rourke and Williamson discuss three notable examples of globalization and its political backlash in the 
late 19
th century (early 20
th century): (1) cheap grain from the New World threatened agricultural incomes 
in Europe, leading to tariffs on agricultural imports from the New World; (2) mass immigration from 
Europe threatened New World living standards, escalating immigration restrictions in the New World; and 
(3) European manufactured exports threatened emerging industries in the New World, leading to high 
tariffs in the New World on European manufactured imports.   
3 Some analysts have referred to this as a flattening of the world, others as disaggregating the value chain 
such that products, and components of manufactured products, are manufactured worldwide. 
4 See Green, Felstead, and Burchell (2000) for a summary. 
5 Data from the 2006 GSS will be available in early 2007, and we plan to update after that time.. 
-2-security into the 21
st century and, more specifically, whether offshoring has played a 
significant role in fostering this insecurity.  We build upon the work of Scheve and 
Slaughter (2004), who examine the impact of foreign direct investment on economic 
insecurity in Great Britain from 1991 to 1999. We find evidence suggesting that workers 
in tradable industries and occupations express higher levels of economic insecurity; 
additionally, workers expressing higher levels of insecurity demand greater social 
insurance.   
Our empirical work attempts to resolve some widely ignored issues in the GSS 
literature.  The GSS dataset consists of a time series of cross-section surveys, but not a 
panel structure.  In other words, we cannot follow individuals through time.  However, 
unique among such datasets, the GSS includes many responses per individual on related 
(and unrelated) questions.  Our estimation strategy is two fold. At the micro level we use 
auxiliary information (responses to auxiliary survey questions) to remove (filter) 
individual effects. Our second estimation strategy is one of cohort-specific effects, or, 
specifically, regional macroeconomic analysis. 
The paper is organized into the following sections.  Section 2 reviews the 
economic theory as it pertains to globalization. Section 3 describes our data.  Section 4 
presents our individual and cohort level empirical specification and analysis.  Section 5 
discusses policy implications and proposals. The final section concludes. 
2  Theory 
Economic insecurity is most often understood as an individual’s perception of the risk of 
economic misfortune (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Scheve-Slaughter, 2004).  Economic 
misfortune can be thought of as individuals’ inability to purchase goods and services (or 
provide for their families), which primarily depends on their income.  In reality, the 
majority of Americans do not earn their primary income from dividend payments or stock 
options, but rather from wages from labor income. Therefore, we assume that economic 
insecurity primarily stems from volatility in wages and employment, caused by volatility 
in the labor market.  As a result, this section utilizes labor theory in conjunction with 
trade theory to explain how offshoring affects economic insecurity via increases in 
industries’ labor-demand elasticities. 
-3-2.1  Globalization and the elasticity of demand for labor 
An industry’s own-price labor demand elasticity, ηj
d
, consists of two parts, the scale effect 
(sηj) and the substitution effect (–1[1–s]σj) so that  ηj
d
 = –1[1–s]σj – sηj.
6  The scale effect 
tells us how much labor demand changes after a wage change due to a change in output.   
The substitution effect tells us, for a given level of output, how much firms substitute 
away from labor and toward other factors of production when wages rise.  Both the scale 
and substitution effects reduce the quantity of labor demanded when wages rise.  For the 
purpose of this paper, we focus on the processes in which offshoring increases labor-
demand elasticities via the substitution effect.
7  
Suppose an industry is vertically integrated with a number of production stages.  
Trade allows domestic firms to lower production costs by offshoring work to foreign 
businesses and importing intermediate inputs (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999). 
Trade thus increases the number of factors that firms can substitute in response to higher 
domestic wages beyond just domestic non-labor factors.
8  Therefore, moves toward freer 
trade should increase the elasticity of substitution, σj. Firms need not actually offshore 
jobs to increase σj; the potential of offshoring is sufficient (Slaughter, 2001). As this 
substitutability increases, labor demand becomes more elastic.
9  Additionally, the smaller 
s the stronger is the pass-through from σj to ηj
d
.   As a result, higher wages generate larger 
changes in the quantity of labor demanded the less important labor is in total costs.
10   
                                                 
6 Where s is labor’s share of industry total revenue; σj is the constant-output elasticity of substitution 
between labor and all other factors of production; and ηj is the product-demand elasticity for industry j’s 
output market. ηj
d
  is defined as negative; s, σj, and ηj are positive. 
7 Scheve and Slaughter (2004) note several reasons for focusing on the substitution effect: first, because it 
is direct, that is, it places domestic workers in competition with foreign labor, and, second because other 
researchers (primarily Rodrik, 1997) have emphasized in theory its possible role in generating insecurity.   
8 According to Freeman (2005), the opening of India, China, and the former Soviet bloc to international 
commerce during the 1990s approximately doubled the worlds supply of labor from 1.46 billion workers to 
2.92 billion.  However, these countries brought with them limited capital, dropping the global labor-to-
capital ratio by approximately 40 percent, decreasing the returns to labor, and increasing the returns to 
capital.  Based on the findings of Rauch and Trindade (2003), this massive increase in the labor supply in 
foreign nations has nearly equal proportionate effects as a domestic increase in labor supply on U.S. labor-
demand elasticity, suggesting that without change in U.S trade policy,  the increased openness in other 
nations will have the same effect on labor-demand elasticities. 





10 This is where the role of increasing automation affects labor-demand elasticities.  Increases in automation 
will reduce s, increasing the pass-through effect. Replacing a worker with a computer will exacerbate the 
impact of trade on the labor-demand elasticity. 
-4-2.2  Labor-demand elasticities and labor market volatility 
The above expressions demonstrate how offshoring increases labor-demand elasticities. 
Figure 1 (below) illustrates how increasing labor-demand elasticities induce greater wage 
and employment volatility in the labor market, thus causing greater economic insecurity.  
First we look at the case of a closed economy in which firms cannot substitute 
foreign labor for domestic labor.  Assume workers have the ability to adjust their work-
leisure time or relocate, allowing the total labor supply to be relatively elastic, S0.  In a 
closed economy, firms face a demand for skilled labor,
a D0 .  In an open economy, firms 
have the ability to substitute foreign labor for domestic labor, increasing the labor-
demand elasticity, denoted by curve b D0 . 
Assume a labor productivity shock increases the marginal product of labor, 






1 . In the closed economy, the labor 
market moves from equilibrium at point x to equilibrium at point y, increasing wages 
from W0 to W1 and employment from E0 to E1.  If firms have the ability to substitute 
foreign labor for domestic labor, the same increase in productivity will lead to greater 
volatility in wages and employment, denoted by the equilibrium at point z.  Increased 
economic insecurity reflects workers’ response to the greater volatility in employment 
and wages within their industry (Rodrik, 1997; Slaughter, 2001). 
2.3  Impact of insecurity on the average worker 
There are four important implications from increased labor-demand elasticities 
(economic insecurity).  Most noteworthy is the decline in workers’ bargaining power 
leading to slower wage growth
11 and rising income inequality
12 (e.g., Aaronson and 
                                                 
11 Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan famously stated that increased insecurity doubtlessly 
played a role in the slowdown of wages, as workers would be less inclined to ask for a pay raise because of 
fear of job loss.  
12 Slaughter (2001) finds evidence the labor-demand elasticity for low-skilled labor has increased; however, 
the evidence does not suggest the same is true for high-skilled workers.  Coupled with the results of 
Aaronson and Sullivan (1998), Slaughter’s findings would suggest slower wage growth for low-skilled 
workers than their high-skilled counterparts.  Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) suggest that globalization 
has lead to a decreasing demand for low-skilled workers relative to their high-skilled counterparts.  They 
find that computers account for 35 percent of the increase in relative wage for nonproduction (skilled) 
workers, while offshoring can explain 15 percent.  Others have found that increased trade has only a 
marginal impact on the demand for labor (e.g., Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1994; Strauss-Kahn, 2003).  
While it may be fair to assume the demand for low-skilled workers has not increased as rapidly as the 
-5-Sullivan, 1998).  Second, increases in the elasticity of labor demand shift the costs of 
benefits, such as healthcare, away from firms toward workers.
13  Third, Benito (2006) 
finds that increased insecurity causes households to defer consumption. Finally, Burchell 
(1999) concludes that economic insecurity is damaging to workers’ health.    
On the other hand, gains from globalization have been quite large and have taken 
many different forms, specifically, lower prices, higher profits, and increased product 
variety.  Estimates by Bradford, Grieco and Hufbauer (2006) suggest that future gains 
from removing the rest of U.S trade barriers could add at least another $1.3 trillion to the 
U.S. economy annually.
14 However, as previously mentioned, a large majority of workers 
rely on wages from labor income, not profits, to provide for their families.  While the 
gains from globalization have been grand for the economy as a whole, when the average 
worker constructs an opinion about the effect of globalization, the direct impact of 
declining wages (real and relative) and increasing healthcare costs will likely outweigh 
the more indirect benefits. 
3  Variables to capture the peril of globalization 
Our empirical work seeks to examine how workers’ perceptions of their economic 
insecurity are affected if they work in industries (or occupations) that are susceptible to 
offshoring.  Our data are from the General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The survey is 
administered in February and March of each sample year, with the total number of 
respondents ranging from 1,468 to 2,832.  Since 1994, the GSS has been conducted on a 
biannual basis.  Respondents answer questions regarding their demographic information 
and opinions on a plethora of topics, including two questions about earnings and 
employment expectations.  These questions were included in 17 surveys between 1977 
and 2004.  We use the responses from these two questions to measure economic 
insecurity.  So far as we are aware, this is the only large survey dataset for the United 
States that contains such questions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
demand for high-skilled workers, rising insecurity (labor-demand elasticities) can explain an increasing 
income gap between high- and low-skilled workers within and across industries. 
13 See Rodrik (1997) p.18 for a complete discussion. 
14 The authors believe this may be an underestimate, perhaps by a great deal. 
-6-  The first question, which we label joblose, asks: “Thinking about the next 12 
months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off—very 
likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?”  The second question, which we 
label jobfind, asks: “About how easy would it be for you to find a job with another 
employer with approximately the same income and fringe benefits you now have? Would 
you say very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?”  We combine the answers of these 
two questions in order to define a variable that measures if workers believe they will 
suffer a pay cut or unemployment as a result of job loss.  Following Schmidt (1999), we 
define a binary variable, costly job loss, as those respondents who said they were very or 
fairly likely to lose their job in the next year and also said it would not be easy at all to 
find another job with similar pay and benefits.  We assume workers are indifferent 
between two jobs with similar pay and benefits, as both jobs would provide the same 
level of economic security as defined in Section 2. 
  In order to relax this assumption and allow for more variability between 
respondents, we construct a supplemental variable, insecure.  The variable ranges from 0 
to 5 depending on how respondents answered the two survey questions.  With regard to 
joblose, scores range from 0 to 3. If respondents answered very likely they were assigned 
a score of 3; somewhat likely, 2; not too likely, 1; and not at all likely, 0.  Similarly, for 
jobfind, scores range from 0 to 2.  If respondents answered not easy at all, they were 
assigned a score of 2; somewhat easy, 1; and very easy, zero.  The scores from the two 
questions are simply summed to construct the variable insecure.
15 Although summarizing 
the survey’s information in such categorical variables is far from ideal, there are few 
alternatives. 
Figure 2 exhibits two patterns. First, workers’ expectations about losing their jobs 
and finding new jobs have moved fairly closely with the unemployment rate.  Second, 
during the economic recovery of the 1990s, and to a greater extent the recovery in the 
2000s, workers were more pessimistic about both job loss and finding a job than they 
                                                 
15 We also construct two other variables; likelose and hardfind which equal 1 if respondent answers very 
likely or very hard, respectively, and zero otherwise.  For the sake of brevity the empirical results using 
costly job loss and insecure are present in this paper. Others are available on request. 
-7-were during the previous periods of low unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s, as 
highlighted by the growing divergence with the unemployment rate.
16 
  Our theory hypothesizes that tradable industries (and occupations) will exhibit 
more-elastic labor demands, which, raises labor-market volatility.  According to the 
findings of Jensen and Kletzer (2005), this is exactly the case.  Tradable industries have 
job-loss rates that are notably higher than those safe from offshoring: 0.152 compared 
with 0.076.  Moreover, occupations exposed to global trade exhibited higher rates of job 
loss than safe occupations: 0.22 compared with 0.094.  Additionally, workers in tradable 
industries saw income (in logs) loss of -0.30 compared with -0.14 in non tradable 
industries.  Therefore, we expect workers in industries and occupations safe from 
offshoring to express significantly lower levels of economic insecurity.  Following the 
results of Jensen and Kletzer, we construct our offshoring variables.
17 
To develop an empirical approach to identify activities that can be potentially 
offshored, Jensen and Kletzer assume activities traded domestically can be potentially 
traded internationally, even if they currently are not.  Using spatial clustering, they group 
industries and occupations into “Gini classes,” where those industries and occupations 
with Gini coefficients less than 0.1 are classified as “Gini class 1” or non tradable.  We 
base our construction of our two offshoring variables on their results.
18  The variable 
pIND identifies those industries in which activities can be offshored.  Industries such as 
personal services (e.g., teeth cleaning) are coded as zero, or non tradable.   There is no 
reason a dentist or hygienist would worry about their job being offshored.  Other 
industries in which the work could feasibly be offshored are coded as one. 
Similar to offshoring threats by industry, certain occupational groups are directly 
or indirectly affected by offshoring.  Some workers may find themselves in industries 
where they are safe from offshoring but are in an occupation in which employees in 
similar jobs in different industries are being offshored.  Such is the case with 
administrative support positions. An administrative assistant at a dentist’s office may not 
                                                 
16 The first and to some extent the second patterns were previously recognized by Schmidt (1999).  
17 See Jensen and Kletzer (2005) for further discussion of the methodology used to identify tradable 
industries and occupations. 
18 The GSS reports respondents’ Census industry and occupations codes, while Jensen and Kletzer use 
NACIS and Major Standard Occupations Classification codes; therefore we use our best judgment to apply 
their results. See Table 1 for comparative figures. 
-8-fear that his job will be offshored, but if he does lose his job it may be harder for him to 
find a new job because other industries have been able to offshore this work.  We 
construct a variable pOC to identify those occupational groups that are safe from 
offshoring.  Occupations safe from offshoring (e.g., judges or physicians) are coded as 0; 
those that can be offshored are coded as 1. Using these two variables exploits the fact that 
respondents provide information on their industries as well as their occupations within 
their respective industries.
19   
Workers’ perceptions about their economic security are formed by many 
characteristics beyond the pressures from offshoring.   Consequently, we construct a 
number of individual-level control variables.
20  The variable Income is a categorical 
variable measuring real household income.
21  Union equals 1 if the respondent belongs to 
a union, and 0 if not. Degree is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 the 
lowest education and 5 the highest.  AgeGr is a vector of binary variables corresponding 
to respondents’ respective age group at the time of the survey. White, Black, and Other 
equal 1 if the respondent identifies as white, black, or other, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. Self equals 1 if the respondent identifies himself as being self-employed and 0 
otherwise. Region is a vector of nine binary variables corresponding to the nine Census 
divisions.
22 Unemployment measures the share of workers unemployed in a respondent’s 
census region during the survey year.
23 Finally, Year is a vector of binary variables 
controlling for year fixed effects. 
                                                 
19 In addition to the potential for offshoring, the magnitude of offshoring activity within an industry (or 
region) may be of some importance.  Higher levels of offshoring activity could indicate greater mobility, 
which in turn raises labor-demand elasticities and perceptions of employment risks (Scheve and Slaughter, 
2004).  However, U.S regional import data per se are not available (see Hervey, 1999), nor is Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) data by industry classification at comparable levels of disaggregation. Moreover 
Scheve and Slaughter construct an FDI magnitude  variable that produces coefficients that are not 
statistically different from their potential coefficients at a 95percent confidence level. 
20 See appendix table 6 for more information. 
21 The GSS asks respondents to report their annual household income within equal nominal brackets that 
arbitrarily change over time. The values range from 1 for the lowest income bracket to 9 for the highest 
income bracket.   We compute the annual median value and use the deviation from the median value as a 
proxy for real household income, (e.g. If in year y, the median respondent, I, reported his family income to 
be in bracket 4 then respondent i's real family income was coded as zero. If respondent i+1 reported to have 
a family income for year, y in bracket 5, i+1’s real family income is coded as 1). 
22 If respondent lives in the respective Census region at the time of the survey, they are assigned a value of 
1, and 0 otherwise. We will later use this information for our cohort analysis. 
23 These data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
-9-The control variables are likely to account for some of the variation among 
individuals’ perceptions about their economic security.  However, individual-specific 
immeasurable and/or unobserved differences may also matter.  When answering the GSS 
survey question about finding a new job, one respondent may believe he could find a new 
job paying 10 percent less with comparable benefits and answer “somewhat easy”, while 
another respondent may be in the same situation and say “not easy at all.”  Unlike the 
U.K. panel survey data used by Scheve and Slaughter, the GSS is a time series of cross-
sections that does not track the same individual over different years. We are unable to 
control for individual-specific effects using the standard practice.
24 We use auxiliary data 
from the GSS survey to approximate the existing individual bias. 
The GSS asks respondents a question about their past financial situation and 
general happiness, specifically: “During the last few years, has your financial situation 
been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?  Taken all together, how would you 
say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not 
too happy?”  We code the respondents’ answers to these questions with values ranging 
from 1 to 3, where 3 equals getting better and very happy.  Using this coding, we 
construct the variables fSit and gHap.   
Including these variables in our models allows us to approximate unobserved 
effects that influence the respondents’ answers to the economic insecurity questions.   
More specifically, fSit can be thought of as a proxy for a lagged dependent variable, as 
respondents’ past financial situation’s will likely influence their future outlook.  The 
gHap variable can be thought of as a bias correction, as generally happy people are more 
likely to be optimistic when expressing their perceptions of economic security.
25  
Including these variables in our estimation produces more precise estimates, but by no 
means accounts for all the unobserved individual effects that are possible in a panel 
structure. 
 
                                                 
24 Starting in 2008 the GSS will switch from a repeating cross-section design to a combined repeating 
cross-section and panel-component design.  When these new data become available they will allow future 
research to test our approach of controlling for individual-specific effects. 
25 There is clearly an endogeneity issue between general happiness and economic security that we correct 
for using IVmethods.  Survey questions on martial status, occupational happiness, financial satisfaction, 
and friendship happiness are reserved to satisfy identification restrictions. 
-10-4  Empirical specification, estimates and analysis 
In section 4.1, we analyze the pooled cross-section time-series GSS data using ordered 
probit models, so as to examine the variation in our measures of economic insecurity at 
the individual-respondent level. In section 4.2, we stratify the data by Census region and 
estimate a Deaton-style “pseudo-panel” model to examine economic insecurity at a more 
macroeconomic regional level. Among other advantages, this framework allows us to 
replace certain macroeconomic variables used in the individual-respondent model 
(aggregated from the GSS dataset) with more satisfactory aggregate regional data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
4.1  Individual level 
In cases where the variable to be estimated is limited to a range of values and contains 
discrete responses, probit models are employed to provide the best estimation (e.g., coin 
toss).  As noted by Aaronson and Sullivan (1998), in cases where the underlying variable 
(perceived economic insecurity) is continuous in nature but approximated by discrete and 
ordered responses of a survey question, the appropriate statistical technique is the use of 
ordered probit models. The ordered probit regression is based on a latent regression such 
as  *
i y  = βxi + εi, where  *
i y  is the unobserved economic insecurity of individual i, xi are 
demographic and other individual characteristics of individual i, and εi  is a person-
specific error term. The parameter β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  Although 
we do not observe  *
i y , we observe k possible answers allowed by the survey and the 
construction of our insecurity measures, as represented by yi: 
yi =0 if  *
i y ≤µ0 
yi =1 if  µ0≤ *
i y ≤µ1 
yi =2 if  µ1≤ *
i y ≤µ2 
.  .  . 
yi = k if  µk-1≤ *
i y . 
 
For example, for the costly job loss variable, yi=1 corresponds to answering 
“somewhat likely” or “very likely” and “very hard,” whereas for the insecure variable, 
yi=5 corresponds to “very likely” and “very hard.”  The µi’s are unknown intercept 
parameters to be estimated.   
-11-Table 2 reports the coefficients and standard errors from specifications that use 
costly job loss and insecure as dependent variables.  The first three columns of the table 
use costly job loss as the dependent variable and the last three columns use insecure. The 
results are reported relative to a base-case white, female, non-union, age 25 to 39, who 
lived in the northeast in 1988.  The model fits well. The majority of the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs.  A notable exception is the Union variable, which 
has a positive and highly significant coefficient.
26  The unobserved individual-effect 
variables  gHap and fSit have the largest impact on our insecurity variables.  Our 
potential-for-offshoring variables, pIND and pOC, are positive and significant across all 
model specifications, supporting our hypothesis that employees in industries and 
occupations safe from offshoring will express lower levels of job insecurity. 
 Assuming  E(εi)=0 and V(εi)=σ
2, we can calculate the base case probability of each 
of the k answers. 
        Φ(µ0 + βx)    if  j=0 
Prob (y= j|x) =    Φ(µ0 + βx) - Φ(µj-1 + βx)  if 0 < j ≤k-1 
       1-Φ (µk-1 + βx)   if  j=k, 
 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  From the equation 
above, we can calculate the marginal effects on the base case by 
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where φ  is the standard normal density function and the x variables are measured at their 
mean value.  In many cases, the independent variables are binary indicators, such as male 
or white.  In this case, the marginal effect is calculated as follows: 
 
                                                 
26 If we assume that union membership is, in fact, exogenously determined, this coefficient suggests that by 
joining a union the respondent will express higher levels of job insecurity. Theoretically this does not make 
much sense, as workers join unions to increase their job security.  On the other hand, the natural decline of 
union membership in the United States and  higher union wages means that if union members do lose their 
job it is very likely they will experience a pay cut.   See Bender and Sloane (1999) for further discussion. 
-12-Prob (y= j|x´,1) – Prob (y= j|x´,0), 
 
where x´, 1 is the vector of covariates where the male (white) variable is set to 1 and x´, 0 
is the vector of covariates where the male (white) variable is set to 0.    
The base-case probabilities and marginal effects, in Table 3, measure the impact 
of a change in the respective independent variable on the probability of the respondent 
expressing a certain level of job insecurity. For example, for every unit increase in the 
regional unemployment rate, the probability of expressing costly job loss increases 0.56 
percent, all else constant.  The first row of this table shows that the probability of the 
base-case person expressing costly job loss is 6.2 percent.  
  With respect to our offshoring variables, pInd and pOC, the probability the base-
case worker will express costly job loss if she works in an industry and occupation with 
the potential for offshoring increases to about 8.5 percent, from 6.2 percent.  The 
individual-effect variables play even a greater role in predicting workers’ economic 
insecurity. Specifically, the probability that the base-case respondent will express costly 
job loss is only about 2 percent if they are “very happy” and have seen their financial 
situation improve over the past few years.  The probability that the same base-case 
respondent will express costly job loss is about 10 percent if they are “not too happy” and 
have seen their financial situation get worse.  
 Figure 3 plots the estimated probabilities of costly job loss and insecure over the 
sample period.  As we expect, workers probability of expressing economic insecurity 
moves in sync with fluctuations in the labor market, measured by the national 
unemployment rate. However, in 2004 there is a significant departure from this trend, 
suggesting that recent improvements in the labor market have not quelled economic 
insecurity as they have in the past 
Breaking down the probabilities even further in Figure 4, we see that upper-class 
workers have seen some reprieve from improvements in the labor market but 
middle/working class and lower class workers continue to express heightened levels of 
economic insecurity. Data since 2000, by education level show that workers across all 
education levels are expressing higher levels of economic insecurity, with lower-educated 
workers experiencing the starkest increases.  Somewhat contrary to previous findings, our 
-13-results suggest that the economic growth of the 1990s eventually reduced workers 
economic insecurity, although never to levels lower than those of the 1980s. 
4.2  A Regional level, Pseudo-Panel Model 
Above, we have conducted estimation with the pooled GSS dataset. Because the GSS is a 
series of cross-sections and not a panel dataset, it is not possible to control for individual 
effects nor to estimate a dynamic model that uses lagged dependent and independent 
variables.
27  Deaton (1985) introduced the concept of stratifying such datasets according 
to certain exogenous variables, creating a “pseudo-panel” dataset. There are two 
underlying assumptions needed to successfully convert the GSS data into a panel 
structure. First, if there are individual-specific effects, there will be equivalent additive 
cohort effects. Second, the sample cohort means are consistent estimates of the true 
cohort means. Consider the simple theoretical model, it it it it x y ε β + = , where yit is the 
measure of job insecurity of individual i at time t,  xit is a vector of demographic 
individual characteristics, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ε is the error 
term.  In a normal panel structure, researchers track certain individuals over time, 
allowing econometricians to use individuals as their own controls, or individual fixed-
effects, modeled as 
 
it i it it x y ε θ β + + = ,           ( 1 )  
 
where  θi captures the individual fixed effect.  Since θi  will be correlated with other 
explanatory variables, this equation can only be consistently estimated from panel data.  
However, consider a case where i is a member of a well-defined cohort monitored 
through successive surveys.  Let i belong to a cohort, c, and calculate the simple 
population averages of (1) over all i belonging to c to obtain 
 
* * * *
ct c ct ct x y ε θ β + + = ,           ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
27 Our variables gHap and Fsit appear to be fair approximations of these individual effects; that is to say, 
they are powerful predictors of economic insecurity. 
-14-where the asterisks denote population means.  In practice, these cohort population means 
can be estimated by cohort means from the sample. We then get sample cohort means, 
forming the relationship 
ct ct ct ct x y
_ _ _ _ _
ε θ β + + = ,           ( 3 )  
where  ct
_
θ  is the average of the fixed effects for those i part of c that show up in the 
survey.
 28  
Deaton’s work considered only static panel models, but later econometric studies 
have examined the possibility of estimating dynamic pseudo-panel models. The 
necessary conditions for consistent estimation of such models are stringent and, in our 
opinion, unlikely to be fulfilled in most non-panel survey datasets; see for example 
Verbeek and Vella (2005).
29  Hence, we do not pursue dynamic pseudo-data panel 
models. 
Following Deaton’s methodology, we group our data into regional cohorts 
corresponding to the nine census regions, reducing the total observations in the sample to 
153.  Averaging our individual dummy variables produces regional composition 
measures, (i.e., 50 percent of the sample is male).  Due to the reduction in observations 
and the large number of regressors, we estimate the following fixed-effects model to 
preserve degrees of freedom:   
ct c ct ct c ct x x y y
_ _ _ _ _ _
) ( ε β + − = − ,          ( 4 )  
where  c y
_
 and  c x
_
 are the means of each regional cohort over  all sample years. 
  Grouping the GSS data into regional cohorts allows us to replace certain state and 
local variables created via aggregation of GSS survey questions with more satisfactory 
(in our opinion) state and regional data from the Census Bureau and BEA. For example, a 
measure of real household income is included on GSS dataset; in the pseudo-panel 
                                                 
28 After conducting data sampling tests, we assume  ct
_
θ = *
c θ . Note: The GSS is not a random sample, and 
we lose some observations due to question availability; therefore, we use information from other sources to 
test if the cohort sample means equal the cohort means of other data sources.  For example, we use regional 
cohorts, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides employment data by region.  Amongst other 
things we test if the distribution of employment between regional cohorts is equal to the true employment 
distribution reported by the BEA.  See appendix table A.2 for results. 
29 Other papers discussing dynamic pseudo-panel models include Moffit (1993) and Collado (1997). 
-15-models, we can use BEA estimates of real per capita personal income.
30   To check 
robustness, we estimate our models with both the GSS and BEA measures.
31  Further,  
the GSS race classifications of white, black, and other are not statistically representative 
of the regional demographic mix; therefore, we substitute the Census Bureau’s regional 
composition of races into our models. 
Table 4 reports ordinary-least-squares estimates as specified in equation 4.
32  
Overall, the model appears to fit the data reasonably well, predicted and actual values are 
closely correlated, and the residuals are both uncorrelated and normally distributed (see 
appendix tables A.3). However, there are some incongruities between the regional models 
and individual models.   Specifically, in the individual models both pInd and pOC are 
highly significant and positive, while in regional models the coefficients on pOC are 
consistently negative, although insignificantly different from zero.  Additionally, it 
appears that there may not be enough variability in costly job loss to determine the signs 
of our regressors.  We find that a 1 percent increase in the number of workers employed 
in industries with the potential for offshoring will increase insecure by about a half a unit 
or the percentage of workers expressing costly job loss by 0.5 percent. 
 
                                                 
30 Aaronson and Sullivan (1998) and Schmidt (1999) omit income from their econometric models; we find 
household income is highly significant as a predictor of economic insecurity. This omission likely biases 
their results. 
31 Real per capita personal income from BEA, (Chn. 2000$)  
32 Other authors (Moffit,1993; Collado,1997; Verbeek and Vella, 2005) suggest dynamic estimation 
methods that may be better suited for cohort analysis.  Due to limited degrees of freedom and good model-
fit, we believe this parsimonious model is sufficient.  
-16-5  Policy 
Our findings verify the economic theory that globalization generates economic volatility 
leading to worker insecurity.   Specifically, workers in industries (and to some extent 
occupations) susceptible to offshoring will express higher levels of economic insecurity. 
Our findings have significant policy implications for the politics of globalization and 
social-insurance policies. 
5.1  Implications 
 
Globalization, by increasing economic insecurity, amplifies workers demands for social 
insurance. Agell (1999) notes that private markets are not likely to accommodate the 
demand for human-capital-related insurance.  If governments are unwilling and/or unable 
to address these demands, workers will seek protectionism as a method of relieving their 
insecurity.  Unlike other data sources, the GSS provides us with the ability to determine 
whether this link from increased insecurity to greater demands for social insurance truly 
exists.   
Figure 5 illustrates that workers (over the last 30 years) have continued to demand 
that government provide increased funds for health, education, and social security 
programs.  The graph also shows an increase in the 1980s and a severe decline in 1993 in 
the demand for social insurance.  The high levels of demand for social insurance in recent 
years corroborate exit-poll results that indicated voters elected a Democratic Congress in 
an effort to reduce their insecurity, either through increased protectionism or social 
insurance.  From a cross-sectional approach, the correlation between economic insecurity 
and demands for social insurance becomes more pronounced.   
Table 5 reports the mean values of the demand-for-social-insurance variable by 
level of economic insecurity.  Workers who express fear of costly job loss or high levels 
of insecurity express significantly higher demands for a social safety net than workers 
who feel secure.  At the regional level, the evidence is quite similar to Table 2.  The east 
and west coasts express fairly low levels of economic insecurity but demand relatively 
more funding for government programs.  However, in the most discerning cases of the 
East South Central (MS, AL, TN, and KY) and West North Central (ND, SD, NE, KS, 
-17-MN, IA, and MO) regions, economic insecurity appears to be closely related to the 
demand for social insurance.
33  Combined with our regression analysis, these correlations 
tend to support the theory that increased offshoring increases insecurity, which stimulates 
the demand for social insurance.   
5.2  Proposals 
According to Bradford, Grieco and Hufbauer (2006), the lifetime loss by workers 
displaced from offshoring is estimated at about $50 billion dollars a year, a small 
percentage of the $0.8 to $1.3 trillion in public gains from liberalization.  However, these 
costs are markedly higher than the $248 million federal outlays for trade adjustment 
assistance in 2001 (Storey, 2000). Moreover, instead of devoting resources to make the 
U.S. workforce more dynamic, federal outlays continue to be directed toward 
protectionist policies— the annual maximum spending on farm subsidies is $23 billion.  
The future of the Doha round of trade negotiations suggests that the outlook for further 
liberalization is bleak if policymakers continue pushing for protectionism instead of 
helping workers deal with the current and future pains associated with globalization.
34   
Among others, Lori Kletzer and Robert Litan (2001) have proposed two benefit 
programs that would reduce the economic insecurity of American workers, specifically 
those affected by offshoring: wage insurance and subsidies for health insurance. They 
estimate these programs would cost about $3.5 billion annually.  The wage-insurance 
program essentially works as follows: A displaced worker who once earned $40,000 a 
year and found a new job paying $30,000 a year would receive $5,000 a year for two 
years after the initial layoff.   The authors believe a benefit of this type of policy, 
compared with unemployment insurance, is that it would reduce the duration of 
unemployment instead of increasing it.  Potential negative externalities are the 
underemployment of workers and depression of wages, as a wage insurance plan is an 
incentive for people to take jobs for which they are overqualified.  On the other hand, it is 
likely that displaced workers had acquired job-specific skills that warranted a higher 
                                                 
33 See appendix section A.5 for regional insecurity and demand for social insurance maps. 
34 Many have argued that without adequate progress on agriculture subsidies, developing nations will not 
make the concessions needed to complete the Doha round of trade negotiations.   See Schott (2004) for 
further discussion.  
-18-wage in their previous job, skills that cannot be transferred to their new place of 
employment. 
  Consistent with our results, Bergsten (2005) suggests a more fundamental remedy 
to increase the support for globalization—better education.  If the average worker 
completed four more years of school, turning a high school graduate into a college 
graduate, the average worker would be about 1.2 percent less likely to feel vulnerable to 
costly job loss.
35  According to Bergsten, increased education actually increases the 




6  Conclusions 
The exit polls and results of the 2006 congressional elections have raised much concern 
regarding increased protectionism.  Americans fear that the inexorable trends in global 
integration and offshoring will threaten the standard of living of future generations.  Our 
research suggests that these perceived effects of globalization on labor-market volatility 
are, in fact, real and that future backlash is quite probable without structural change.  The 
findings in this research support the existence of a connection among offshoring, 
economic insecurity, and the demand for social insurance. 
First, our research provides individual-level and macroeconomic evidence of a 
link between the threat of offshoring and workers’ perceptions of their job insecurity.  
We find that workers in industries and occupations susceptible to offshoring are about 30 
percent more likely to express costly job loss and document rising trends in economic 
insecurity in the middle/working class in recent years.  We also find that while 
educational attainment is a strong predictor of insecurity, even the most educated workers 
have begun to express higher levels of insecurity.      
Next, our results imply evidence of the link between workers’ perceived job 
insecurity and demands for social insurance and document that the rising trends in both 
                                                 
35 While this increase may appear small in nominal terms, the probability of a high school graduate 
expressing costly job loss is roughly 6.8 percent, thus a decline in probability of 1.2 percent is a relative 
decline of 17.6 percent.    
36 There is much consensus that increased education is the best solution to combating the backlash toward 
globalization for numerous reasons; for the sake of brevity they are not all discussed here.  
-19-areas, are likely to threaten future economic integration.  Individual and regional cross-
sectional analysis supports the premise that economic insecurity causes workers to 
demand more social insurance.  Finally, we review a few policies aimed at relieving 
workers’ insecurity.   
This article advances the GSS literature by addressing its shortcomings.  Using 
auxiliary data and cohort-level analysis, we are able to proxy unobserved individual 
effects normally unfeasible to control for in cross-section time series data.  Robust 
conclusions across all model specifications suggest the appropriateness of these 
techniques.  According to the National Opinion Research Center, future GSS releases 
with a panel structure will allow research to test our results in light of new information. 
  Scheve and Slaughter (2004) was the first article to provide empirical tests at the 
individual level of the relationship between globalization and the economic insecurity of 
workers.  This article builds on their work by using U.S. data over three decades, as 
opposed to U.K data for eight years.  Additionally, we attempt to determine whether there 
is a link between increased insecurity and demands for greater social insurance, an issue 
that Scheve and Slaughter leave for future research.  Although this article does not 
empirically test this hypothesis, it explores GSS data well suited to answer this question.  
We leave it to future research to empirically test if, in fact, the apparent relationship 
between economic insecurity and demands for social insurance is, in fact, causation.   
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Table 1. –   Share of total employment in occupations and industries 
 
Industry   Occupation 
   Non  tradable  Tradable 
  48.43 14.55  Non tradable 
 (50.03)  (10.79) 
  19.96 17.07 
Tradable 
   (21.64)  (17.54) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are from Jensen and Keltzer (2005), table 6. 
-29-Table 2. –   Likelihood of expressing economic insecurity: ordered probit analysis 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
  Costly job loss    Insecure 
Regressor  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
           
pInd  .2685*** .4800*** .4802***    .1568*** .1594*** .1900*** 
  (.0589) (.1110) (.1069)    (.0283) (.0278) (.0348) 
pOC  .1847*** .3450*** .3154***    .1702*** .1682*** .1744*** 
  (.0575) (.1078) (.1045)    (.0272) (.0267) (.0335) 
gHap    -.5542*** -1.005***      -.1780*** -.6064*** 
    (.0956) (.2220)      (.0220) (.0931) 
fSit    -.9898*** -.7707***      -.1239*** -.0892*** 
    (.2658) (.2464)      (.0178) (.0247) 
Income  -.0438*** -.0560*** -.0432***    -.0239*** -.0157*** -.0104*** 
  (.0067) (.0126) (.0129)    (.0032) (.0033) (.0041) 
Degree  -.1225*** -.2285*** -.2149***    -.0886*** -.0784*** -.0874*** 
  (.0281) (.0575) (.0550)    (.0118) (.0116) (.0148) 
Unemployment  .1242*** .2017*** .1982***    .0828*** .0761*** .0906*** 
  (.0326) (.0600) (.1982)    (.0164) (.0161) (.0197) 
Union  .4041*** .6857*** .6453***    .3716*** .3540*** .3846*** 
  (.0692) (.1348) (.1312)    (.0363) (.0355) (.0492) 
Self  -.3648*** -.6402*** -.5633***    -.3331*** -.3290*** -.3468*** 
  (.1010) (.1807) (.1731)    (.0397) (.0387) (.0510) 
18 to 24  -.2337** -.3233*  -.3236*    -.1586***  -.1380***  -.1560*** 
  (.1004) (.1821) (.1737)    (.0454) (.0449) (.0533) 
40 to 54  .0507 .0145 -.0031    .1329***  .1020***  .1084*** 
  (.0627) (.1135) (.1078)    (.0297) (.0295) (.0353) 
Over 55  -.0711 -.1773 -.1360    .2590***  .2387***  .3026*** 
  (.0857) (.1535) (.1475)    (.0401) (.0395) (.0506) 
Black  .3535*** .5611*** .4739***    .2113*** .1849*** .1726*** 
  (.0751) (.1460) (.1430)    (.0416) (.0411) (.0498) 
Other  -.0332 -.0970 -.1285    .0599  .0453  .0222 
  (.1492) (.2756) (.2607)    (.0657) (.0651) (.0761) 
Male  .0524 .1472 .1213    .02401  .0250 .0221 
  (.0556) (.1030) (.0976)    (.0258) (.0254) (.0298) 
Intercept 1  2.937*** 1.899***  1.036   -.1959* -.9356***  -1.846*** 
  (.2869) (.5527) (.6602)    (.1144) (.1295) (.2561) 
Intercept 2        .5748***  -.1716  -.9723*** 
        (.1151)  (.1290)  (.2287) 
Intercept 3        1.604***  .8485***  .1961 
        (.1206)  (.1304)  (.2150) 
Intercept 4        2.367***  1.610***  1.070*** 
        (.1286)  (.1338)  (.2234) 
Intercept 5        2.945***  2.180***  1.728*** 
        (.1377)  (.1389)  (.2393) 
Year dummies  yes yes yes    yes yes yes 
Regional dummies  yes yes yes    yes yes yes 
Instruments  no no yes    no no yes 
N  8080 8006 7959    7899 7825 7782 
Log  likelihood  -1551 -1500 -7884      -11803  -11629  -17782 
Note: Each cell reports the maximum- likelihood parameter estimate and, in parentheses, its standard error. Each model includes the 
following base case: female, white, non-union, who lived in the northeast in 1998 and worked in an occupation and industry safe 
from offshoring.  The heteroskedastic robust standard errors are adjusted for respondents’ past financial situations. gHap likely being 
endogenous, survey questions on marital status, occupational happiness, financial satisfaction, and friendship happiness are used as 
instruments. 
* Significant at the 90 percent level. 
** Significant at the 95 percent level. 
***Significant at the 99 percent level. 
 
-30-Table 3. –   Marginal effects on base-case probability 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
  Costly Job Loss    Insecure 
   no=0  yes=1     0  1 2 3 4 5     
Base-case  probability  .9377  .0623    .2212  .2366 .3220 .1423 .0493 .0286   
                
pInd  -.0135  .0135    -.0330  -.0239 .0149 .0216 .0113 .0090   
pOC  -.0089  .0089    -.0303  -.0220 .0138 .0198 .0104 .0083   
gHap  .0283  -.0283    .1053  .0764 -.0476 -.0689 -.0362  .0289   
fSit  .0217  -.0217    .0155  .0112 -.0070 -.0101 -.0053 -.0042   
                 
Income  .0012  -.0012    .0018  .0013 -.0008 -.0012 -.0006 -.0005   
Degree  .0060  -.0060    .0152  .0110 -.0069 -.0099 -.0052 -.0042   
Unemployment  -.0056  .0056    -.0157  -.0114 .0071 .0103 .0054 .0043   
Union  -.0182  .0182    -.0668  -.0484 .0302 .0437 .0230 .0183   
                 
self  .0159  -.0159    .0602  .0437 -.0272 -.0394 -.0207 -.0165   
18 to 24  .0091  -.0091    .0271  .0197 -.0123 -.0177 -.0093 -.0074   
40 to 54  .0000  -.0000    -.0188  -.0137 .0085 .0123 .0065 .0052   
Over 55  .0038  -.0038    -.0525  .0381 .0238 .0344 .0181 .0144   
Black  -.0134  .0134    -.0300  -.0217 .0136 .0196 .0103 .0082   
Other  .0036  -.0036    -.0039  -.0028 .0017 .0025 .0013 .0011   
Male  -.0034  .0034    -.0038  -.0028 .0017 .0025 .0013 .0011   
                 
d_1978  -.0024  .0024    .0019  .0014 -.0009 -.0012 -.0007 -.0005   
d_1983  -.0088  .0088    -.0142  -.0103 .0064 .0093 .0049 .0039   
d_1985  -.0096  .0096    -.0070  -.0050 .0031 .0046 .0024 .0019   
d_1988  -Base Year-   
d_1989  .0008  -.0008    .0063  .0045 -.0028 -.0041 -.0022 -.0017   
d_1990  -.0004  .0004   -.0123  -.0089 .0056 .0081 .0042 .0034   
d_1991  -.0196  .0196    -.0313 -.02274 .0142 .0205 .0108 .0086   
d_1993  -.0227  .0227    -.0447  -.0324 .0202 .0293 .0154 .0123   
d_1994  -.0163  .0163    -.0543  -.0394 .0246 .0355 .0187 .0149   
d_1996  -.0174  .0174    -.0283  -.0205 .0128 .0185 .0097 .0078   
d_1998  -.0149  .0149    -.0251  -.0182 .0113 .0164 .0086 .0069   
d_2000  -.0067  .0067    -.0034  -.0024 .0015 .0022 .0012 .0009   
d_2002  -.0147  .0147    -.0329  -.0239 .0149 .0215 .0113 .0090   
d_2004  -.0257  .0257    -.0519  -.0376 .0235 .0340 .0178 .0142   
Note: The average marginal effects presented in this table correspond to ordered probit models (3) and (6) in Table 2. An insecure 
value of 5 suggests the workers economic insecurity is high and a value of 0 suggests the worker is very secure. 
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N=153 Dependent  variable 
  costly job loss    insecure 
Regressor  (1) (2) (3)      (4)  (5) (6) 
             
pInd  .0548 .0607  .0773***    .5478**  .5535**  .6715*** 
  (.0475) (.0424) (.0298)    (.2724)  (.2710)  (.2553) 
pOC  -.0441 -.0103  -.0518**    -.0902  .0148  -.0293 
  (0445) (.0400) (.0235)    (.2554)  (.0599) (.2556) 
Degree  -.0189 -.0056  -.0240*    -.3387***  -.2960***  -.3519*** 
  (.0164) (.0147) (.0125)    (.0940)  (.0940)  (.0829) 
Unemployment  .0128*** .0147*** .0132***   .1079***  .1016***  .1128*** 
  (.0030) (.0023) (.0026)    (.0172)  (.0156)  (.0167) 
Income  .0023 .0008  .0041**    .0045  .0164  .0108 
  (.0031) (.0022) (.0020)    (.0175)  (.0156)  (.0164) 
d_1977  -.0010 -.2965 .1627    -.0968  -.0239  -.4853 
  (.0206) (.6509) (.5591)    (.1184)  (.7048)  (.7145) 
d_1978  .0014 -.1776 .4413    -.1649  -.5205 -1.062 
  (.0194) (.6321) (.9233)    (.1114)  (.6771)  (.7264) 
d_1982  .0035 -.2657 .1958    -.0805  .0098  -.5158 
  (.0201) (.6318) (.5743)    (.1155)  (.6785)  (.6471) 
d_1983  .0146 .0242 .5603    -.0158  .3059 -.0323 
  (.0188) (.5913) (.5589)    (.1079)  (.6383)  (.5903) 
d_1985  -.0015 -.0489 -.0215    -.0078  .2416  -.0073 
  (.0149) (.5147) (.5021)    (.0857)  (.5360)  (.5129) 
d_1986  .0176 .2655 .5456    -.0566 -.3000 -.4627 
  (.0146) (.5011) (.4917)    (.0837)  (.5202)  (.5091) 
d_1988  -Base Year- 
d_1989  -.0040 -.1909 -.7594    .0312  .0471  .1737 
  (.0140) (.4933) (.5532)    (.0806)  (.5073)  (.4858) 
d_1990  -.0074 -.4379 -.3282    .0369  .1135  .1510 
  (.0143) (.5018) (.4862)    (.0818)  (.5158)  (.4916) 
d_1991  .0085 .4707 .2221    .1078  .7504  .5795 
  (.0146) (.5099) (.4954)    (.0835)  (.5263)  (.5016) 
d_1993  0.0221 .8816*  .7270    .2032**  1.387***  1.107** 
  (.0148) (.5164) (.5013)    (.0850)  (.5360)  (.5087) 
d_1994  .0105 .4339 .2884    .2627***  1.679***  2.048*** 
  (.0148) (.5156) (.4964)    (.0849)  (.5324)  (.5176) 
d_1996  0.0053 .2944  .0342    .2212**  1.258**  1.653*** 
  (.0157) (.5304) (.5307)    (.0902)  (.5558)  (.5696) 
d_1998  .0080 .6369 .0347    .1555  .5717  1.336 
  (.0193) (.6092) (.5960)    (.1110)  (.6585)  (.9533) 
d_2000  -.0113 -.1433  -2.200**    .0249  -.3714  -.1060 
  (.0234) (.6991) (1.127)    (.1342)  (.7767)  (.8085) 
d_2002  .0096 .5895 .0034    .1653  .5713  .6774 
  (.0244) (.7555) (.5909)    (.1403)  (.8325)  (.7312) 
d_2004  .0080 .4299 -.0435    .2610*  1.137  1.325 
  (.0261) (.8034) (.6016)    (.1501)  (.8869)  (.8708) 
Intercept  -.0042 -.1353 -.0575    -.0602  -.3697  -.2793 
  (.0107) (.3739) (.3582)    (.0615)  (.3870)  (.3661) 
Heteroskedascity correction    Region  Year      Region  Year 
R²  .42 .57 .65     .59  .61  .63 
Note: Each cell reports the coefficient and, in parentheses, its standard error. Heteroskedastic standard errors are calculated using the 
standard deviation of the ordinary-least-squares residuals. Coefficients on demographic controls are not reported. See appendix table 3 for 
analysis of residuals. 
** Significant at the 95 percent level.  
***Significant at the 99 percent level. 
 








Error  Observations 
By costly job loss       
1  =  Yes  0.478 0.518 0.438 0.020  446 
0  =  No  0.415 0.425 0.405 0.005  7336 
By insecure        
5  0.508 0.573 0.443 0.033  185 
4  0.471 0.516 0.426 0.023  356 
3  0.419 0.446 0.392 0.014  1091 
2  0.417 0.435 0.399 0.009  2593 
1  0.417 0.437 0.397 0.01  1918 
0  0.402 0.424 0.380 0.011  1639 
        
Entire sample  0.419 0.429 0.409 0.005  7782 
Note: Upper and lower bounds represent 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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A.1.   Summary Statistics 
  Years: pre and post New Economy 
Variable 1978-1991  1992-2004    
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Net ∆ 
Costly Job Loss*  0.060 0.237 0.054 0.226  - 
Insecure  1.634 1.237 1.637 1.203  + 
liklose*  0.049 0.216 0.042 0.201  - 
HardFind*  0.412 0.492 0.396 0.489  - 
pIND*  0.327 0.469 0.303 0.460  - 
pOC*  0.375 0.484 0.364 0.481  - 
gHap  2.237 0.594 2.215 0.585  - 
fSit  2.312 0.761 2.321 0.754  + 
JobHap  3.347 0.770 3.324 0.776  - 
FinHap  2.032 0.741 2.034 0.729  + 
FrdHap  2.853 0.855 2.869 0.843  + 
Married  0.611 0.488 0.527 0.499  - 
DivSep*  0.163 0.369 0.199 0.399  + 
Never Married*  0.195 0.396 0.245 0.430  + 
Widowed*  0.032 0.175 0.029 0.168  - 
18 to 24*  0.107 0.309 0.086 0.280  - 
25 to 39*  0.472 0.500 0.416 0.493  - 
40 to 54*  0.283 0.451 0.368 0.482  + 
over 55*  0.138 0.345 0.130 0.336  - 
Male*  0.541 0.498 0.489 0.500  - 
Degree  1.455 1.146 1.687 1.159  + 
White*  0.881 0.324 0.814 0.389  - 
Black*  0.098 0.297 0.125 0.330  + 
Other*  0.021 0.143 0.061 0.240  + 
Union*  0.166 0.372 0.153 0.360  - 
Income  0.282 4.114 -0.023 4.599  - 
Self*  0.132 0.339 0.131 0.338  - 
Unemployment*  0.070 0.018 0.054 0.013  - 
Observations 4314 3468     
Notes: Sample is of full-time workers; Degree 1 equals High School; Degree 2 equals Associate/Junior 
College; due to data manipulation we cannot convert Income into a dollar value. 









Atlantic  EaNoCen WeNoCen SouAtl ESouCen WeSoCen Mountian Pacific 
1977 0.0584  0.1617 0.1918  0.0823  0.1595  0.0614  0.0996  0.0475  0.1377 
1978 0.0582  0.1601 0.1903  0.0815  0.1605  0.0606  0.0999  0.0483  0.1406 
1979 0.0582  0.1593 0.1878  0.0807  0.1605  0.0601  0.1011  0.0496  0.1426 
1980 0.0583  0.1582 0.1821  0.0801  0.1619  0.0600  0.1038  0.0508  0.1449 
1981 0.0584  0.1569 0.1797  0.0794  0.1632  0.0589  0.1066  0.0519  0.1450 
1982 0.0588  0.1554 0.1758  0.0789  0.1649  0.0584  0.1092  0.0529  0.1456 
1983 0.0590  0.1544 0.1737  0.0784  0.1664  0.0584  0.1096  0.0539  0.1462 
1984 0.0592  0.1533 0.1731  0.0775  0.1682  0.0583  0.1093  0.0544  0.1466 
1985 0.0591  0.1534 0.1721  0.0770  0.1697  0.0582  0.1088  0.0540  0.1477 
1986 0.0589  0.1535 0.1718  0.0768  0.1720  0.0580  0.1057  0.0537  0.1496 
1987 0.0587  0.1530 0.1714  0.0762  0.1739  0.0576  0.1044  0.0531  0.1517 
1988 0.0582  0.1518 0.1717  0.0760  0.1751  0.0572  0.1035  0.0532  0.1534 
1989 0.0573  0.1504 0.1723  0.0755  0.1756  0.0571  0.1032  0.0536  0.1550 
1990 0.0565  0.1490 0.1689  0.0739  0.1773  0.0570  0.1034  0.0548  0.1591 
1991 0.0555  0.1468 0.1683  0.0751  0.1785  0.0574  0.1051  0.0562  0.1571 
1992 0.0549  0.1441 0.1690  0.0756  0.1792  0.0578  0.1059  0.0572  0.1562 
1993 0.0544  0.1426 0.1700  0.0758  0.1798  0.0584  0.1062  0.0589  0.1540 
1994 0.0535  0.1404 0.1707  0.0762  0.1802  0.0590  0.1064  0.0611  0.1525 
1995 0.0530  0.1390 0.1707  0.0764  0.1806  0.0592  0.1068  0.0626  0.1517 
1996 0.0529  0.1390 0.1696  0.0763  0.1810  0.0591  0.1071  0.0630  0.1520 
1997 0.0528  0.1391 0.1684  0.0755  0.1815  0.0587  0.1069  0.0635  0.1535 
1998 0.0526  0.1380 0.1671  0.0751  0.1821  0.0585  0.1072  0.0645  0.1550 
1999 0.0525  0.1373 0.1665  0.0746  0.1829  0.0582  0.1072  0.0650  0.1558 
2000 0.0522  0.1366 0.1654  0.0742  0.1841  0.0579  0.1069  0.0655  0.1572 
2001 0.0522  0.1366 0.1639  0.0744  0.1839  0.0572  0.1074  0.0662  0.1582 
2002 0.0523  0.1371 0.1614  0.0746  0.1846  0.0570  0.1080  0.0668  0.1583 
2003 0.0519  0.1360 0.1602  0.0744  0.1861  0.0570  0.1086  0.0676  0.1581 
2004 0.0513  0.1357 0.1589  0.0739  0.1872  0.0566  0.1092  0.0687  0.1584 
2005 0.0508  0.1352 0.1576  0.0733  0.1890  0.0560  0.1095  0.0695  0.1590 
2006 0.0504  0.1343 0.1573  0.0728  0.1913  0.0558  0.1089  0.0710  0.1583 
               
1977-
2004  0.0557  0.1471  0.1719 0.0767 0.1750  0.0583  0.1060 0.0578 0.1516 
Bold 
Years  0.0560  0.1475  0.1716 0.0765 0.1751  0.0582  0.1061 0.0573 0.1518 
GSS  0.0521  0.1460  0.1829 0.0840 0.1813  0.0645  0.0946 0.0615 0.1380 
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Costly job loss (1) 
 




































A.4.  Demand for social insurance variable 
Primary survey question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of 
which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, 
and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much 
money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. 
Specific Areas:  1-(a) Health (b) Improving the nation’s health  
   2-Social  Security 
   3-Welfare 
   4-(a)Education  (b)  Improving  the nation’s education system 
Potential Answers: 1-Too  much 
   2-About  right 
   3-Not  enough 
   4-Don’t  know/  N.A. 
Calculation: 
The respondents’ answers to each question are scored as follows: too much, -1; about 
right, 0; not enough, 1. The answers to the four questions are averaged to a score ranging 
from -1 to 1. 
 
A.5.  Regional levels of economic insecurity and demand for social insurance 
 
 
Note: The maps show the average values of insecure (left) and demand for increased funding for government programs (right) by 
census region over the period from  1977 to 2004. 





A. 6.  Construction of Variables 
Variable Range  of  Values  Calculation 
costly job loss (CjL)  0 to 1  if θ = "very likely" or "somewhat likely and if π= "not easy at all" then 
CjL=1 else CjL=0.  
like lose (LiL)  0 to 1  if θ = "very likely" then LiL=1 else LiL=0.  
hard find (HdF)  0 to 1   if π= "not easy at all" then HdF=1 else HdF=0. 
insecure (InS)  0 to 5  If θ = "very likely" then InSa=3; if θ = "somewhat likely" then InSa=2, if θ = 
"not too likely" then InSa=1; if θ = 'not at all likely' then InSa = 0. If π = "not 
easy at all" then InSb = 2; if π = "somewhat easy" then InSb = 1; if π = "very 
easy" then InSb = 0.  InS = InSa + InSb. 
pInd  0 to 1  pInd = 1 if Gini class = 0 and zero otherwise. 
pOC  0 to 1  pOC = 1 if Gini class = 0 and zero otherwise. 
fSit  1 to 3  fSit =1 if respondent describes their past financail situation as "getting 
worse";  fSit = 2 if respondent describes their past financail situation as 
"stayed the same"; fSit = 3 if respondent describes their past financail 
situation as "getting better". 
gHap  1 to 3  gHap =1 if respondent describes themselves as "not too happy"; gHap = 2 if 
respondent describes themselves as "happy"; gHap = 3 if respondent 
describes themselves as "very happy". 
Income*  1 to 9  Income =1 if respondents household income is in the lowest bracket; Income 
= 9 if respondents household income is in highest bracket.  Regional models: 
real household income, as reported by the BEA. 
Degree  1 to 5  if Degree = "less than high school" then Degree = 1; if Degree = "High 
School" then Degree = 2; if Degree = "Associate/Junior College" then 
Degree = 3; if Degree = "Bachelor" then Degree = 4; if Degree = 
"Advanced Degree" then Degree = 5. 
Unemployment  2.8 to 12.5  regional unemployment rate, as reported by the BLS 
Union  0 to 1  Union = 1 if respondent answered "Yes" or "Yes, Both";  Union = 0 if 
respondent answered "No" or "Spouse." 
Self  0 to 1  Self = 1 if employment status = "self employed"  and zero otherwise 
18 to 24  0 to 1  18 to 24 = 1 if  18 ≤ respondent age < 25 and zero otherwise. 
25 to 39  0 to 1  25 to 39= 1 if  25 ≤ respondent age < 40 and zero otherwise. 
40 to 54  0 to 1  40 to 54 = 1 if  40 ≤ respondent age < 55 and zero otherwise. 
Over 55  0 to 1  Over 55 = 1 if  55 ≤ respondent age and zero otherwise. 
Black  0 to 1  Black = 1 if race = "Black" and 0 otherwise. 
White  0 to 1  White = 1 if race = "White" and 0 otherwise. 
Other  0 to 1  Other = 1 if race = "Other" and 0 otherwise. 
Male  0 to 1  Male = 1 if sex = "male" ;  Male = 0 if sex = "Female." 
Married  0 to 1  Married =1 if marital status = "married" and 0 otherwise. 
DivSep  0 to 1  DivSep =1 if marital status = "divorced/separated" and 0 otherwise. 
Widowed  0 to 1  Widowed =1 if marital status = "widowed" and 0 otherwise. 
NevMar  0 to 1  NevMar =1 if marital status = "never married" and 0 otherwise. 
fSat  1 to 3  fSat =1 if respondent describes their opinion of their finances as  "not 
satisfied";  fSat = 2 if respondent describes their opinion of their finances as  
"more or less satisfied";  fSat = 3 if respondent describes their opinion of 
their finances as "well satisfied". 
fHap  1 to 4  fHap =4 if respondent describes the frequency of social activities as   "daily" 
or "few times a week";  fHap = 3  if respondent describes the frequency of 
social activities as  "few times a month" or "monthly";  fHap = 2  if 
respondent describes the frequency of social activities as “several times a 
year" or "annually";  fHap = 1  if respondent describes the frequency of 
social activities as "never".  
oHap  1 to 4  oHap =4 if respondent describes work life as  "very satisfied";  oHap = 3  if 
respondent describes work life as  "satisfied" ;  oHap = 2 if respondent 
describes work life as  "a little dissatisfied";  oHap = 1 if respondent 
describes work life as  "very dissatisfied".  
Note: θ = job loss question, π= job find question, * see note 19 for more information 
-39- 
-40-